Scapegoat: John Dewey and the character education crisis by White, Brian
Grand Valley State University 
ScholarWorks@GVSU 
Funded Articles Open Access Publishing Support Fund 
5-13-2015 
Scapegoat: John Dewey and the character education crisis 
Brian White 
Grand Valley State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/oapsf_articles 
 Part of the Education Commons 
ScholarWorks Citation 
White, Brian, "Scapegoat: John Dewey and the character education crisis" (2015). Funded Articles. 47. 
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/oapsf_articles/47 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Publishing Support Fund at 
ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Funded Articles by an authorized administrator of 
ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gvsu.edu. 
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cjme20
Download by: [Grand Valley State University] Date: 20 January 2016, At: 10:40
Journal of Moral Education
ISSN: 0305-7240 (Print) 1465-3877 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjme20
Scapegoat: John Dewey and the character
education crisis
Brian White
To cite this article: Brian White (2015) Scapegoat: John Dewey and the character education
crisis, Journal of Moral Education, 44:2, 127-144, DOI: 10.1080/03057240.2015.1028911
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2015.1028911
© 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &
Francis
Published online: 13 May 2015.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 916
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Scapegoat: John Dewey and the
character education crisis
Brian White
Grand Valley State University, MI, USA
Many conservatives, including some conservative scholars, blame the ideas and influence of John
Dewey for what has frequently been called a crisis of character, a catastrophic decline in moral
behavior in the schools and society of North America. Dewey’s critics claim that he is responsi-
ble for the undermining of the kinds of instruction that could lead to the development of charac-
ter and the strengthening of the will, and that his educational philosophy and example exert a
ubiquitous and disastrous influence on students’ conceptions of moral behavior. This article sets
forth the views of some of these critics and juxtaposes them with what Dewey actually believed
and wrote regarding character education. The juxtaposition demonstrates that Dewey neither
called for nor exemplified the kinds of character-eroding pedagogy his critics accuse him of
championing; in addition, this paper highlights the ways in which Dewey argued consistently
and convincingly that the pedagogical approaches advocated by his critics are the real culprits in
the decline of character and moral education.
Keywords: moral education, character education, moral behavior, pedagogy, character,
educational philosophy
Violence, bullying and antisocial behavior seem to have reached epidemic propor-
tions in the schools and on the streets of the United States (US) (Akiba,
LeTendre, Baker, & Goesling, 2002; Brooks, 2011; Leming, 1996; Males, 2001;
Pellegrini & Bartini, 2000; Smagorinsky, 2002; Snyder et al., 2010; Tendero,
2000). Various observers (see for example McDonnell, 2008; Noonan, 2012) refer
to the present state of affairs as a ‘crisis of character’. Hunter (2000) explains that
the word crisis ‘derived from the field of pathology in which it was understood as
“a critical point in the development of a disease”’ (p. 79). Given that understand-
ing, Hunter doubts that there is, presently, a crisis of character in the US. From
his perspective, if there ever was such a decisive moment, it occurred long ago,
perhaps toward the end of the nineteenth century, after which the patient died.
For ‘character’, says Hunter (2000, p. xiii), ‘is dead’.
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Determining the cause of death is no easy matter. According to Hunter (2000),
for example, character’s demise cannot simply be attributed to individual moral
failure, however widespread, for ‘there are … larger historical forces at work’
(p. xiv) including ‘multinational capitalism, … pluralism and social mobility, …
[and] the contemporary communications media and popular culture’ (p. xiv).
Although Hunter (2000) seems to cherish some hope that character may be
resuscitated, in light of these complex forces he concludes that ‘there is something
about the historical unfolding of [American] moral culture that resists all … efforts
to … oppose it’ (p. 79). Indeed, he writes that ‘no amount of political rhetoric,
legal maneuvering, educational policy-making, or money’ (p. xiii) will soon be able
to restore ‘character as a common feature within American society and a common
trait of its people’ (p. xiii).
Given the plethora of character’s enemies and the disease’s stubborn resistance,
one would think that identifying a single cause and a simple cure would be all but
impossible. When faced with bewildering catastrophes, however, people crave
straightforward explanations and easy remedies, often leading to the identification of
a solitary villain, someone to blame, a scapegoat. According to Girard (1986), even
when a disaster is irreducibly complex, victims and observers tend to ‘convince
themselves that a small number of people, or even a single individual, despite his
relative weakness, is extremely harmful to the whole of society’ (p. 15). In keeping
with Girard’s (1986) observations, many conservatives have determined that John
Dewey is responsible for the entire complex of character-related problems in the US.
In this article, I juxtapose some of the specific accusations leveled against
Dewey with what Dewey actually wrote, thus revealing both that his critics are
wrong to blame him for a crisis of character in the US and that he is a terribly
uncooperative, argumentative scapegoat. I begin by demonstrating that relatively
powerful conservative voices both in and outside of the academy have laid the
blame for the crisis of character at Dewey’s doorstep. I then rebut, in turn,
three of the critics’ particular accusations: first, that Dewey sought to weaken
students’ wills in the face of difficulty and temptation; second, that Dewey
sought to minimize the influence of mature adults who could facilitate and
perhaps even ensure character development in the young; and third, that Dewey
sought to prevent students from studying and learning the academic content
peculiar to each discipline, thus undermining discipline in general. Following
these rebuttals, I present Dewey’s counterargument that the approaches to
teaching advocated by so many of his critics are the chief impediments to
education in character. I then discuss two potential reasons why the critics have
chosen Dewey as their scapegoat: first, their erroneous belief that, although
Dewey might have been something of a champion of character early in his
career, he later abandoned the concept; and second, their mistaken identification
of Dewey’s rejection of religion with a rejection of, even an antipathy toward,
the development of character.
We turn first to what at least appears to be a conservative certainty: that Dewey
is to blame for a crisis of character.
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A presumption of guilt
According to Laats (2012), although there is no single, conservative viewpoint with
regard to what ails public education in America, virtually all ‘conservative revision-
ists … lambaste the pernicious influence of John Dewey’ (p. 6), arguing that he
‘took over and destroyed American schools’ (p. 3). Not only is there near unanim-
ity among conservatives that Dewey is to blame, but Laats (2012) also reports
similar agreement regarding Dewey’s strategy for destroying American education:
many conservatives charge that he did it by attacking ‘its roots as a thoroughly
Christian and Protestant institution’ (p. 3). As Apple (2006) has noted, although
a variety of conservative groups have opposed progressive approaches to teaching
and learning, ‘the sheer number and range of these protests by religious conserva-
tives exceed those by all other groups’ (p. 136). Apple (2006) identifies a number
of conservative, religious groups that exert nationwide influence (e.g. Citizens for
Excellence in Education, the American Family Association and Focus on the Fam-
ily); these groups, writes Apple (2006), believe Dewey’s influence to be ‘evil’
(p. 136) and argue that Dewey has ‘led schools astray’ (p. 137).
Many such groups are more political and pastoral than they are scholarly, but
conservative scholars have also blamed Dewey for the character crisis in the US.
For example, Murphy (2005, p. 285) alleges that
Dewey could be considered singularly responsible for the dramatic change in schools
… from the character-promoting mission of American education established in colonial
days to the current situation in which violence, unethical behavior and disrespect
toward others [run] rampant not only in our schools but also in our society.
As we have seen, Hunter (2000) shares Murray’s bleak assessment of the state of
character education; and despite both his understanding that the nation’s sense of
moral crisis predates Dewey by centuries—‘it was as urgent in the seventeenth
century as it is today’ (p. 77)—and his recognition of the complexity of the prob-
lems, he also shares Murphy’s (2005) opinion that Dewey may be primarily
responsible. In Hunter’s (2000) view, Dewey’s ideas have been central to the
undermining of ‘such qualities as promptness, truthfulness, courtesy, and obedi-
ence and industry’ (p. 60), which, prior to ‘Dewey’s innovations’ (p. 60), had
‘occupied an uncontested, quasi-sacred place in mainstream public discourse and
social life’ (p. 60). Edmundson (2006) also writes that character education is a
‘straightforward task’ (p. 27), but that educators struggle with it because of
Dewey’s ‘devaluation of character education’ (p. 27). More specifically,
Edmundson (2006) claims that Dewey devalues character education in part by
‘[eliminating] the “will” from any meaningful role in moral development’ (p. 26).
As we shall now see, Edmundson (2006) is not alone in leveling this charge.
Accusation #1: Dewey seeks to weaken students’ wills
In fact, many other critics (see for example Hirsch, 1987; Kirk, 1985; Lockerbie,
1994; O’Hear, 1991) accuse Dewey of devotedly following Rousseau toward a
John Dewey: the character education crisis 129
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free-wheeling child-centeredness without will, discipline or direction, which has
led to a demonstrable and devastating collapse of character in the schools.
Kliebard (2002) convincingly rebuts the charge that Dewey is Rousseau’s disciple:
indeed, whether writing with his daughter (Dewey & Dewey, 1915) or on his own,
Dewey at times compliments Rousseau and at other times takes him severely to
task. For example, he (Dewey, 1916/1944) calls Rousseau’s idea that children’s
faculties develop spontaneously ‘pure mythology’ (p. 114) and writes that
Rousseau’s reliance upon ‘random and capricious exercise’ (p. 114) is ‘profoundly
wrong’ (p. 114). These are not the words of a sycophantic disciple.
Dewey’s straightforward statement regarding the error of reliance upon caprice
notwithstanding, he is frequently accused of advocating just such an approach. For
example, according to Braley (1986), Dewey wants to ‘set Johnny free to “blossom”’
(p. 96) unhindered, and O’Hear (1991) charges that children in a ‘Dewey-esque’
(p. 27) school flit from one thing to another ‘as the whim takes them’ (p. 18), driven
not by (or toward) discipline but by fleeting impulses and interests.
Interest does play a central role in Dewey’s thinking; indeed, he anticipates by
many decades the findings of psychologists with regard to interest’s key role in
learning (see for example Hidi, 1990, 2006). Contrary to his critics’ assertions,
however, Dewey’s definition of interest is hardly synonymous with whim. For exam-
ple, Dewey (1897/1964b) identifies ‘interests’ with ‘dawning capacities’ (p. 436).
If these incipient capabilities are to be developed, he (Dewey, 1903) writes, educa-
tors must not simply let children run wild, for the development of interest ‘in-
volves seriousness, absorption, definiteness of purpose, and results in formation of
steadiness and persistent habit in the service of worthy ends’ (p. 12). Edmundson
(2006) and Braley (1986) want us to believe that Dewey seeks to undermine stu-
dents’ will to work, but note Dewey’s words again: seriousness, absorption, definite-
ness of purpose, steadiness, persistent habit—those are willful, character-related words
that would hardly be in the vocabulary of someone who ‘[de-emphasizes] the
work-ethic’ (Braley, 1986, p. 96) or who seeks to eliminate the will from moral
development, as Edmundson (2006) claims. Indeed, Dewey calls for a renewed
focus on students’ interests not because he seeks to weaken students’ wills or
undermine their character, but because he is determined to strengthen them. He
(Dewey, 1903, p. 32; emphasis in original) writes,
Because interests are something that have to be worked out in life and not merely
indulged in themselves, there is plenty of room for difficulties and obstacles which
have to be overcome, and whose overcoming forms “will” and develops the flexible
and firm fiber of character.
Still, Edmundson (2006) is convinced that Dewey’s goal is to allow children to fol-
low impulsive interests without having to work out any difficulties or to overcome
any obstacles; he (Edmundson, 2006) claims that, from Dewey’s perspective,
‘education cannot progress if impulses are “snubbed”’ (p. 33). However, Dewey’s
(1922) view is that ‘educative growth’ (p. 141) can occur only if an impulse is
indeed ‘snubbed’ (p. 141) or ‘blocked’ (p. 141): when a child’s impulse toward an
130 B. White
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interesting pursuit is blocked by obstacles inherent in the situation, ‘the snubbed
impulse … will become a contributory factor in some more inclusive and complex
activity, in which it is reduced to a subordinate and yet effectual place’ (p. 141).
In this way, Dewey’s definition of educative conditions emphasizes both the
impulses inherent in the student and the obstacles to those impulses inherent in
the work the student must do in order to achieve the desired end. The working
out of problems and obstacles as the student pursues essential interests causes
growth, develops character and strengthens the will.
Thus, when Dewey emphasizes the importance of a child’s interest and
impulse, he is not countenancing random pursuits or calling for laissez-faire
instruction. Instead, he (Dewey, 1903) is prioritizing a student’s need to feel a
deep connection to a worthy aim, a goal that has not been imposed from with-
out, apart from his life and experience. For when a student pursues an interest
in the service of a ‘worthy end’ (p. 12), the attendant ‘difficulties are … intrin-
sic; they are significant; their meaning is appreciated because they are felt in
relation to the impulse … to whose outworking they are relevant’ (p. 32). For
Dewey (1916/1944), the essence of education is ‘vital energy seeking opportunity
for effective exercise’ (p. 72), and effective exercise requires both that students’
interests be engaged and that those vital energies be opposed, blocked by the
difficulties intrinsic to the worthy end.
It is important to note that some of Dewey’s critics assume that his notion of a
worthy end does not include behaviors and attitudes generally considered virtuous.
For example, Kirk (1985) claims that Dewey makes the satisfaction of physical
desire the entire aim of life and of schooling, and Edmundson (2006) accuses
Dewey of failing to distinguish between virtue and vice. Similarly, O’Hear (1991)
writes that, for Dewey, ‘any experience is valuable in itself whatever its form or
content’ (p. 20) and argues that Dewey fails to teach students ‘which things are
good and which actions noble—a knowledge of the content of morality’ (p. 22).
These allegations, however, are groundless.
Far from valuing all experiences equally, whatever their content, Dewey
(1938/1963) believes that ‘not … all experiences are genuinely or equally educa-
tive’ (p. 25) and that ‘some experiences are mis-educative’ (p. 25), perhaps
especially experiences in which students are encouraged to pursue fleeting whims
apart from any difficulty or direction. By contrast, educative experiences
strengthen the will and teach students to work together to overcome obstacles
and to resist distractions. Dewey (1903) writes that the problem for the
educator is how to recognize and utilize students’ interests, their dawning
capacities, ‘so that there may grow out of them in due time such a sense of law
and of the claims of law as to hold and reinforce character in critical periods of
temptation’ (p. 27). Are these the words of someone who seeks to disparage the
development of character, to prioritize the satisfaction of appetites or to
eliminate the will?
John Dewey: the character education crisis 131
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Accusation #2: Dewey minimizes the role of teachers in developing character
Still, Dewey’s critics accuse him of arguing that the teacher’s role is to get out of
the way and to let children follow whatever temptation arises; Edmundson (2006)
even claims that, from Dewey’s perspective, to do anything else amounts to ‘abuse’
(p. 50). But Dewey’s call for greater attention to students’ interests, impulses and
experiences is not a call for less authority or less engagement on the part of the
teacher; in fact, he (Dewey, 1938/1963) writes that attending to children’s dawn-
ing capacities ‘may mean more multiplied and more intimate contacts between the
mature and the immature than ever existed in the traditional school, and conse-
quently more, rather than less, guidance by others’ (p. 21). Indeed, Dewey (1938/
1963) criticizes so-called progressive schools that ‘proceed as if any form of direc-
tion and guidance by adults were an invasion of individual freedom’ (p. 22), for
‘guidance given by the teacher to the exercise of the pupils’ intelligence is an aid
to freedom, not a restriction upon it’ (p. 71).
Thus, far from believing that adult guidance amounts to abuse, Dewey (1926/
1964) argues that those who seek to allow children absolute freedom ‘are in a false
position’ (p. 153), however progressive they claim to be. His condemnation of
educators who deny children direction or correction on the grounds that such
interventions represent ‘an unwarranted trespass upon … sacred intellectual indi-
viduality’ (p. 153) is quite clear: ‘Now such a method,’ he writes, ‘is really stupid’
(p. 153). Nevertheless, Dewey is regularly accused of propagating the very idea he
so roundly condemns. The reason, I think, is that he finds just as stupid the
notion that a teacher can do all the work of character formation for the students.
As Westbrook (1991, p. 107) notes, Dewey’s
critique of oppressive benevolence … indicated that the child had to develop this
character for himself if education was to be truly moral. Teachers could not directly
form a child’s character for him, and, even if they could, that molding would not be
ethical.
Indeed, Dewey (1916/1944) believes that ‘we never educate directly, but indirectly
by means of the environment’ (pp. 18–19). Some critics (see for example
Edmundson, 2006; O’Hear, 1991), convinced that character must be taught
directly, argue that Dewey’s insistence on indirection is an abdication of responsi-
bility to transmit common notions of character. However, Dewey values the trans-
mission as much as his critics do. He (Dewey, 1916/1944) writes that adults must
take pains ‘to see that genuine and thorough transmission takes place’ (p. 3), or
else ‘the most civilized group will relapse into barbarism and then into savagery’
(pp. 3–4). Indeed, children cannot survive, let alone receive a transmission of
character, ‘without the guidance and succor of others’ (p. 4). According to
Westbrook (1991), teachers in the Dewey School aimed for a genuine transmission
by educating indirectly, engaging students in collaborative, educative experiences
and guiding them through intrinsic obstacles toward worthy ends. Westbrook
(1991) cites observers of the School who note that, as a result of such engaging
132 B. White
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indirection, students developed and displayed character qualities commonly held
to be essential: cooperation, compromise, reflection and self-control.
Dewey’s critics want teachers to impart character directly (that is, equating
teaching with telling), but Dewey (1916/1944) is convinced that necessary attitudes
and character traits cannot be transmitted by ‘direct contagion or literal inculca-
tion’ (p. 11). From his perspective, ‘beliefs and aspirations cannot be physically
extracted and inserted’ (p. 11); they cannot be ‘hammered in … [or] plastered on’
(p. 11). Thus, while O’Hear (1991) wants ‘to restore the traditional conception of
the teacher as an authority, with knowledge to impart to uneducated minds’
(p. 18) and Breese (1990) touts ‘the lecture method, whereby the mind of the
teacher simply communicates with the mind of the student’ (p. 167), Dewey
(1934/1964) insists that students are not like empty phonographic records waiting
to be inscribed with information and attitudes so that they can faithfully replay
what has been written upon them ‘when the proper button is pushed’ (p. 6) in an
examination, on the playground or on the street corner.
Accusation #3: Dewey depreciates content knowledge
When Dewey argues that teachers cannot hammer information and attitudes into
students, his critics often reply that he advocates an education not only without
teachers but also without content. For example, O’Hear (1991) claims that Dewey
is indifferent to the moral and academic content of instruction and Nash (1990)
writes that Dewey’s preferred approach to instruction is ‘content-less’ (p. 50).
However, Dewey’s own laboratory school was hardly an experiment in content-less
meandering (see for example Mayhew & Edwards, 1936). As Westbrook (1991)
notes, Dewey ‘valued mankind’s accumulated knowledge as much as the most
hidebound traditionalist, and he intended that the children in his elementary
school would be introduced to the riches of science, history, and the arts’
(p. 104). The school’s curricular goals were explicitly stated and obviously
intended to help children ‘to learn to read, to write, to count, to think scientifi-
cally, and to express themselves aesthetically’ (p. 104). Westbrook (1991) con-
cludes that, as far as subject matter was concerned, Dewey’s goals were ‘rather
conventional …. Only his methods were innovative and radical’ (p. 104). And
those methods, radical though they might have been, did not include allowing
children to run wild. Indeed, Westbrook (1991, p. 108) writes,
Dewey’s educational theory was far less child-centred and more teacher-centred than
is often supposed. His confidence that children would develop a democratic character
in the schools he envisioned was rooted less in a faith in the “spontaneous and crude
capacities of the child” than in the ability of teachers to create an environment in the
classroom.
For Dewey, an educative environment is, by definition, subject-matter rich, includ-
ing both academic content and what might be called character content (the
development of personal discipline, the strengthening of the will, a commitment to
John Dewey: the character education crisis 133
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honesty and justice and so on). In using the term character content, I do not meant
to suggest that Dewey approaches the development of character the way so many
character education programs do, with definitions of key concepts established a
priori and solutions to moral dilemmas prefabricated for students. As Pappas
(2008) has noted, however, neither is Dewey a subjectivist, uninterested in
definitions and common understandings of virtue: for Dewey, morality is neither
arbitrary nor representative of ‘an antecedent morality’ (p. 138). Instead, writes
Pappas (2008), ‘moral judgments are ultimately grounded in the standards of a
community’(p. 138). When the community works together to solve vital problems,
they draw upon and develop both academic content knowledge and character con-
tent knowledge, for they must jointly work out both mathematical and interper-
sonal puzzles; they must as a community exercise both investigative and
communicative skills; and they must together decide how to proceed both scientifi-
cally and justly. Thus, from Dewey’s (1938/1963) perspective, the development of
mind and the development of character are complementary, contiguous processes:
an educative environment brings students together to answer important questions
and, in the course of pursuing those answers collaboratively, students learn both
traditional, academic subject matter and how to behave, how to get along, how to
discipline themselves for the sake of the common good. Dewey (1916/1944,
p.129) writes that
a person who is trained to consider his actions, to undertake them deliberately, is in
so far forth disciplined. Add to this ability a power to endure in an intelligently chosen
course in face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty, and you have the essence of
discipline. Discipline means power at command; mastery of the resources available for
carrying through the action undertaken.
Thus Dewey emphasizes the centrality of academic and moral resources to the
development of personal discipline; what he is after is the power both to maintain
momentum in spite of distraction and to choose the direction of that momentum
intelligently, based on serious, committed study of available resources. All of this
requires and contributes to the development of both character and of academic
knowledge.
Far from being indifferent to or hostile to content, Dewey (1916/1944) argues
that the teacher’s job is ‘to organize education so that natural active tendencies shall
be fully enlisted in doing something, while seeing to it that the doing requires
observation, the acquisition of information, and the use of a constructive imagina-
tion’ (p. 137). For Dewey, it is not enough simply to acquire information; nor is it
enough to demand obedience or to enforce restraint. An educative environment
calls forth the interest of the student in the problem at hand, foregrounds the aca-
demic information needed to attack the problem, develops the student’s powers of
observation and decision, strengthens the student’s will as obstacles are confronted
and overcome, and rewards the exercise of character and virtue as students work
reliably together to solve the problems before them. This sort of experience, says
Dewey (1916/1944), is what is most needed ‘to improve social conditions’ (p. 137),
134 B. White
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for having learned to treat one another with honesty, fairness and respect in the
pursuit of a common goal in school, students are more likely to strive for such
healthy, democratic relationships in the larger society as well. The sort of experience
that is least likely to promote academic and moral growth, from Dewey’s perspec-
tive, is the experience that so many of his critics seem to be calling for, in which
teachers present academic information and promote character traits to students,
whose main job is to receive what the teachers attempt to deposit in them.
Dewey as disagreeable scapegoat: the failure of traditional approaches
According to Dewey (1934/1964, p. 6), when students are viewed as empty
receptacles or blank slates without active inner lives or pressing interests, outward
‘conformity then becomes the criterion’ by which both the pupil and the success
of the so-called education in character are judged. One reason why Dewey (1934/
1964) disparages the goal of outward conformity is that ‘initiative, originality and
independence are precious qualities in life’ (p. 6), especially in a democratic soci-
ety where students must be ‘educated for leadership as well as for obedience’
(Dewey, 1897/1964a, p. 113). Another is that, in his view, dogged insistence upon
outward conformity is perhaps the chief reason why so much putative education in
character fails so miserably. From Dewey’s perspective, when teachers tell (and
tell) students what to think and how to behave, and then threaten to punish stu-
dents who fail to fall in line, what develops cannot be called character according to
any sensible definition, for the result even among the compliant is merely passive,
external conformity and divided attention.
Dewey thus consistently resists and rebuts the charge that his indirect approach to
education in subject matter and in character is responsible for a decline in moral
belief and upright behavior among the young. The real culprit, he (Dewey, 1938/
1963) insists, is what he calls ‘the typical traditional schoolroom, with its fixed rows
of desks and its military regimen’ (p. 61); in such circumstances, with so many
restrictions placed upon physical, intellectual and moral freedom, students may
appear to be engaged in instruction, behaving as they ought, but ‘everyone who is
acquainted with … this system … well knows that thoughts, imaginations, desires,
and sly activities run their own unchecked course behind this fac¸ade’ (p. 62). The
reason why Dewey is determined to pay so much attention to students’ natural ten-
dencies, interests and impulses is that they are always present and in operation, even
if they appear not to be. He (Dewey, 1916/1944) is not arguing that all desires are to
be encouraged, for ‘it does not follow that these tendencies are … desirable because
they are natural; but … since they are there, they are operative and must be taken
account of’ (pp. 116–117). The teacher must ‘see to it that the desirable ones have
an environment which keeps them active’ (p. 117)—and an environment designed to
constrain movement and to enforce external conformity is sure to have the opposite
effect, for ‘behind this enforced uniformity individual tendencies operate in irregular
and more or less forbidden ways’ (Dewey, 1938/1963, p. 62).
John Dewey: the character education crisis 135
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Dewey (1938/1963) thus agrees with his critics that ‘the ideal aim of education
is creation of power of self-control’ (p. 64); but he (Dewey, 1916/1944) also
argues that the imposition of behaviors and attitudes cannot achieve the goal, for
in such circumstances students are controlled by others, under threat of punish-
ment, while their inner lives run contrary to the imposed discipline. Some may
believe that forcing students to persist in distasteful work, to go through the
motions of obedience in half-hearted pursuit of an externally imposed goal,
strengthens character; but Dewey (1916/1944) scoffs at the notion that self-control
is the sweet result of bitter labor and grudging compliance. If it were, he (Dewey,
1916/1944, pp. 133–134) writes, then we ought to do our best to ensure that
the subject matter presented is uncongenial, for then there is no motive (so it is sup-
posed) except the acknowledgment of duty or the value of discipline. The logical
result is expressed with literal truth in the words of an American humorist: “It makes
no difference what you teach a boy so long as he doesn’t like it.”
Part of Dewey’s (1916/1944) point is that, outside of school, such a position is
generally thought laughable. In ‘the average schoolroom’ (p. 155), however, there
is so much insistence on conformity and uniformity and so much dependence on
the supposedly salutary effects of seeming obedience that ‘it is hardly possible to
overstate the contrast between such conditions and the situations of active contact
with things and persons in the home, on the playground, in fulfilling of ordinary
responsibilities of life’ (p. 155). Would anyone ever seriously conclude, for exam-
ple, that a doctor or a lawyer ‘would stick to his work more conscientiously if it
was so uncongenial to him that he did it merely from a sense of obligation’
(Dewey, 1916/1944, p. 130)?
Of course not. But the approaches to education advocated by Dewey’s critics
emphasize such external obligation and encourage teachers to ignore, perhaps even
to disparage, the nature of students’ interests and the quality of their present
experiences, leading to a state of affairs in which, even when students appear out-
wardly to be acquiescing to instruction, they are inwardly engaged in strategies of
avoidance. As Dewey (1916/1944) argues, pursuing goals without regard to stu-
dents’ interests and experiences in pursuit of those goals ‘diminishes … the signifi-
cance of the activity and tends to reduce it to a drudgery from which one would
escape if he could’ (p. 106); and many students do escape, says Dewey (1916/
1944), some by rebelling openly, others more slyly and surreptitiously, behind the
fac¸ade of feigned engagement. From Dewey’s (1903) perspective, students who
have learned the skill of displaying outward conformity, perhaps only in order to
avoid the unpleasant ramifications of overt resistance, are developing ‘divided
attention’ (p. 10), not ‘the flexible and firm fiber of character’ (p. 32) or academic
understanding. ‘The great mass of existing school work’ (p. 10), he argues,
contributes to this catastrophic division of attention.
For Dewey, then, the real cause of the decline of character is an approach that
seeks to pound or pour particular attitudes and traits into the minds of students
who, if they are engaged at all, are merely superficially engaged; the culprit is a
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system that enforces conformity and uniformity and denies the existence and the
potential of students’ motivating interests and impulses. Those impulses, argues
Dewey (1903), cannot be suppressed but they may be camouflaged, as each stu-
dent ‘learns in a most miraculous way the exact amount of attention that has to be
given to this external material to satisfy the requirements of the teacher, while sav-
ing up the rest of his mental powers for following out lines of imagery that appeal
to him’ (p. 10). We should not congratulate ourselves for securing such superficial
attention, writes Dewey (1903), for however well behaved the student may appear
to be externally, ‘the deeper intellectual and moral nature of the child has secured
absolutely no discipline at all, but has been left to follow its own caprices, the
disordered suggestions of the moment, or of past experience’ (p. 10). Thus, con-
trary to the assertions of his critics, Dewey is the enemy of caprice whether it is
drawn outward by the removal of all restraint or driven inward by the imposing
strictures of ‘oppressive benevolence’ (Westbrook, 1991, p. 107).
Did Dewey abandon character?
Dewey’s statements in favor of education in character, including widely accepted,
traditional notions of what character may entail (e.g. persistence in the face of diffi-
culty and temptation), are quite straightforward, as are his condemnations of
would-be progressive approaches that supposedly ‘set Johnny free to blossom’
(Braley, 1986, p. 96). In response, critics like Hunter (2000) argue that, although
in his younger years Dewey might have sought to cultivate traditional notions of
character, Dewey later ‘devalued’ (p. 61) or ‘retreated from the concept’ (p. 69).
Similarly, Sichel (1988) asserts that, over the course of his career, Dewey ‘modi-
fied or rather downgraded the concept of “character” within his ethical theory’
(pp. 59–60), basing her judgment in large part on her analysis of the earlier
(Dewey & Tufts, 1908) and later (Dewey & Tufts, 1932) editions of Dewey and
Tuft’s Ethics. Sichel (1988) argues that, in the second edition, ‘character does not
retain the same role and importance’ (p. 60) as in the first and that, therefore,
Dewey ‘downgraded’ (p. 59) the concept.
However, an examination of Dewey’s views after 1932, that is, after the publica-
tion of the second edition of his and Tufts’ Ethics, reveals that he continued to
emphasize the role of character and moral education long after he had supposedly
devalued it. For example, in Experience and Education (Dewey, 1938/1963), he
argues that traditional approaches to education so stifle the movement and thought
of students that teachers can hardly get to know them—and that if teachers do not
have the chance to get to know who their students really are as people and as
thinkers, ‘there is only an accidental chance that the material of study and the
methods used in instruction will so come home to an individual that his develop-
ment of mind and character is actually directed’ (p. 62). Similarly, in Freedom and
Culture (Dewey, 1939/1989), Dewey unapologetically connects his views of the
moral nature of democracy to the ideas of Thomas Jefferson: ‘the chief reason,’ he
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writes, ‘is that Jefferson’s formulation [of the principles of democracy] is moral
through and through’ (p. 119).
Nevertheless, referring specifically to Freedom and Culture, Edmundson (2006)
accuses Dewey of rejecting the abstract moral principles Jefferson introduced into
the Declaration of Independence. According to Edmundson (2006), Dewey
‘suggests that the philosophical principles that underlie that document have “gone
out of vogue”’ (p. 72). However, as the following quote makes clear, it is Jefferson’s
language, not his principles, that Dewey (1939/1989, p. 119) says are out of fashion:
The words in which [Jefferson] stated the moral basis of free institutions have gone
out of vogue. We repeat the opening words of the Declaration of Independence, but
unless we translate them they are couched in a language that, even when it comes
readily to our tongue, does not penetrate today to the brain.
Dewey’s concern here is not that Jefferson was overly moral, but that Jefferson’s
archaic wording may prevent modern generations from understanding and enact-
ing the moral principles embedded in the Declaration. He (Dewey, 1939/1989,
pp. 100–101) writes,
with the founders of American democracy, the claims of democracy were inherently
one with the demands of a just and equal morality. We cannot now well use their
vocabulary. Changes in knowledge have outlawed the significations of the words they
commonly used. But in spite of the unsuitability of much of their language for present
use. . . .the task of those who retain belief in democracy is to revive and maintain in
full vigor the original conviction of the intrinsic moral nature of democracy. . . .which
provides a moral standard for personal conduct.
Here we see that Dewey rejects Jefferson’s language but embraces Jefferson’s view
of democracy as intrinsically moral; indeed, it is because he shares Jefferson’s
determination to maintain democracy’s moral vigor that Dewey rejects Jefferson’s
wording as unsuitable. Although Edmundson (2006) accuses Dewey of saying that
the moral and philosophical principles that underlie the Declaration ‘have been
weakened by historic and by philosophic criticism’ (p. 72), what Dewey (1939/
1989, pp. 119–120) actually says is that,
today … we are not given to associating politics with the plans of the Creator; the
doctrine of natural rights which governed [Jefferson’s] style of expression has been
weakened by historic and by philosophic criticism. To put ourselves in touch with Jef-
ferson’s position we have therefore to translate the word “natural” into moral’.
Thus, in 1939, seven years after the publication of the second edition of his and
Tufts’s Ethics, Dewey places individual and societal morality at the center of his
thinking about democracy. Furthermore, as late as 1946, Dewey writes that dis-
cussions of the meaning, nature and content of character ‘are integral portions of
any adequate ethical theory’ Dewey, 1946, p. 236) and that ‘character is a fact
entering into any moral judgment passed’ (p. 237). So when Sichel (1988) posits
that, by 1932, Dewey ‘perhaps … assumed that the concept of “character” was an
unnecessary residue from older theories’ (p. 60), she must be wrong, as must be
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Hunter (2000), who suggests that the young Dewey emphasized character ‘perhaps
in deference to the popularity of the concept’ (p. 61). Even as his long career drew
to a close, Dewey did not assume character to be unnecessary and, so far as I can
tell, seems to have never, even in his younger years, deferred to the popularity of
any concept.
I do not mean to say that Dewey never changed his mind about anything—his
repudiation of the doctrine of recapitulation is an obvious example. Nor am I
arguing that his views about what character consists of did not evolve. All in all,
however, his view of character throughout his career was remarkably consistent.
For example, early in his career he (Dewey, 1897/1964a) wrote that we cannot
define ‘moral powers’ (p. 114) and ‘ethical values’ (p., 114) apart from specific
situations, because ‘we need to know the social situations with reference to which
the individual will have to use’ (p. 115) those faculties. He says virtually the same
thing nearly 50 years later when he (Dewey, 1946) writes that, in order to discuss
the nature of an ethical standard, we need to focus on all of ‘the essential condi-
tions of the ethical judgment and situation’ (p. 235) and that the definition of a
term such as character depends upon ‘reference to a situation’ (p. 234).
Although Dewey is accused of rejecting the concept, character occupies a
prominent position in his thinking and his writing throughout his career: uphold-
ing the role of the will; urging teachers to provide mature guidance; sternly oppos-
ing the pursuit of fleeting, unfettered whim; insisting on the moral foundation and
responsibilities of democracy; and demanding that those who speak of character get
down to cases so that the definition may not be ‘based upon opinion’ (Dewey,
1946, p. 234). Why, then, would so many of his opponents, scholarly and
otherwise, accuse him of denouncing the development of character and even of
abandoning character entirely? One reason, it seems to me, is Dewey’s personal
rejection of religion and religious tradition.
‘A convenient symbol of opprobrium’
As Girard (1986) notes, in a time of crisis, whether real or imagined, those outside
of the religious mainstream are especially likely to be identified as culpable and,
although Dewey did not abandon the concept of character, he certainly did aban-
don the religious basis that many of his critics find essential to the concept. For
example, Hunter (2000) writes that ‘the demise of character begins with the
destruction of creeds’ (p. xii) and argues that ‘the heart of Dewey’s innovations
was a rejection of revealed religion as the foundation of educational practice’
(p. 60). Indeed, Edmundson (2006) argues that ‘Dewey’s thought is characterized
by hostility … to religion’ (p. 7)—a sentiment shared by a number of other critics
(see for example Braley, 1986; Breese, 1990; Calvert, 2007; Lockerbie, 1994;
O’Hear, 1991; Rushdoony, 1963)—and that Dewey is more interested in
undermining religion than he is in teaching and learning.
Not all of Dewey’s critics find him to be so anti-religious, however. For exam-
ple, Nelson (1987) writes that, although Dewey personally rejected faith in Christ,
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he ‘was never hostile … to what [he] called “evangelical Christianity”’ (pp. 177–
178). Still, so many others have publicly denounced Dewey for being hostile to
religion and have connected his supposed hostility to a general, catastrophic
decline in character that they have made of Dewey ‘a convenient symbol of oppro-
brium’ (Westbrook, 1991, p. 10), and ‘a convenient scapegoat for what’s wrong
with … education’ (Beck, 2008). When well-respected, influential scholars such as
Bloom (2012), Hirsch (1987), O’Hear (1991), Hunter (2000), Kirk (1985) and
Edmundson (2006) blame Dewey for the decline and fall of education and moral
behavior in the West, who can blame concerned citizens on the fringes of the
academy for piling on? For example, with regard to O’Hear (1991) in particular,
Brehony (1997) notes that powerful politicians, journalists and others in Great
Britain frequently ‘[echo] the views of … Anthony O’Hear’ (p. 427) because of
O’Hear’s status as a respected professor of philosophy and because of his partic-
ipation in organizations ‘at the very apex of the English education policy-making
structure’ (p. 427). Evidently, in part because of anti-Dewey pronouncements
made by reputable and otherwise dependable scholars, ‘reviling Dewey has
become fashionable’ (Brehony, 1997, p. 427) on both sides of the Atlantic and is
‘attaining the status of commonsense’ (p. 427).
Of course, fashion is not what is at stake. Some who revile Dewey, counting on
their audience to have appropriated the commonsense, anti-Dewey sentiments
propagated by so many scholars, set Dewey up as a straw man to advance their
own political and educational agendas. Duigon (n.d.) provides an excellent, if
somewhat extreme, example. In an essay intended to convince Christian parents to
pull their children out of public school ‘and make sure they receive a Christian
education,’ Duigon claims that Dewey’s writing about education and democracy
has been ‘most influential’; he then asserts that, because of Dewey’s influence, stu-
dents in the public schools are in danger because ‘what Dewey usually meant by
“democracy” was a mass of docile, conformist commoners benevolently ruled by
an all-wise scientific and political elite’. I trust that those who have actually read
Dewey, whether friends or foes, will recognize the error of Duigon’s assertion, for
Dewey (see for example Dewey, 1916/1944) attacked docility, conformity and elit-
ism at every opportunity he got. Whether Duigon has read Dewey or not I cannot
say, but he certainly attempts to make use of the commonsense notion that Dewey
is out to undermine the learning, the morality and the religiosity of young people.
I began my teaching career in a fine, Christian school and can think of some good
reasons why parents might choose a private, Christian education for their children;
but parents who send their children to public schools need not worry that John
Dewey is going to reach up from the grave to destroy their children’s character.
Breese (1990), however, wants parents to fear exactly that, for he identifies
Dewey as one of seven men who rule the world from the grave. Citing Bloom
(2012) and other mainstream scholars to support his views of public education,
Breese (1990) argues that Dewey ‘refashioned the educational system in America’
(p. 155) and ‘had an effect as well on the way students in most other nations were
educated’ (p. 155); indeed, Breese (1990) argues, Dewey continues to exert a vast
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and catastrophic influence even now, for ‘the world of modern and very confused
thought is ruled by its master, John Dewey’ (p. 177). One of the most visible and
disturbing effects of Dewey’s influence, according to Breese (1990), is that ‘the
old concepts of honor, honesty, virtue, and other truths we once thought to be
self-evident are fading fast’ (p. 171). Like Duigon, Breese’s goal seems to be to
convince Christian parents to abandon the public schools; and, like Duigon,
Breese finds Dewey to be a convenient scapegoat.
Of course, Dewey makes such a convenient scapegoat in part because, although
they might not have read him, so many people have heard of him—and what they
have heard, even from scholars, is that his ‘influence [has been] pervasive’ (Breese,
1990, p. 155). Kliebard (2002) points out, however, that ‘there is obviously a huge
difference between fame or name recognition on the one hand and genuine influ-
ence on the other’ (p. 94) and writes that, in spite of the fact that Dewey has
become a famous symbol of education, ‘beyond the symbolism and the slogans
that still are sometimes voiced in his name, one can find almost nothing in Ameri-
can school practice of the educational ideas that Dewey propounded over the
course of his long life’ (p. 94); Westbrook (1991) concurs, for he writes that
Dewey’s ‘critics have vastly over-estimated his influence’ (p. 543) and that his
‘actual impact on American schools was quite limited’ (p. 542). Brehony (1997)
demonstrates that the same may be said of schools in the United Kingdom (UK),
where Dewey’s influence has been ‘greatly exaggerated’ (p. 429). One critic
(Nelson, 1987) points out an intriguing exception to Dewey’s lack of influence
when he writes that ‘conservative evangelical Christians have harshly criticized
John Dewey, not without reason. Yet ironically, evangelical and fundamentalist
Sunday schools have for a long time practiced his principles’ (p. 116).
Research indicates that if Dewey’s principles were actually more widely known
and practiced in the schools, whether public or private, attempts at character
education might be more successful. For example, Snyder et al. (2010) report that
only one character education program, Positive Action, meets the US Department
of Education’s ‘evidentiary requirements for improving both academics and behav-
ior’ (p. 28); the program relies on exactly the sort of collaborative approach that
Dewey advocated, ‘whereby interaction between teacher and student is encouraged
through the use of structured discussions and activities, and interaction between
students is encouraged through structured or semi-structured small-group activi-
ties, including games, role plays, and practice of skills’ (pp. 31–32). Positive
Action contains additional features that Dewey would support: for example,
instead of being told what character is and how they should behave, students in
the program ‘are asked how they like to be treated. Regardless of age, socioeco-
nomic status, gender, or culture, students and adults suggest the same top values
of respect, fairness, kindness, honesty, understanding/empathy, and love’ (p. 32).
According to Snyder et al. (2010), multiple investigations of the program have
‘reported beneficial effects on student achievement (e.g., math, reading, and
science) and serious problem behaviors’ (p. 28) including suspensions, violence
rates, sexual activity and drug abuse, ‘even though the program does not include
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explicit discussion of these outcomes’ (p. 29). Academic growth and character
development are exactly the results Dewey would have predicted given the indirect,
collaborative and democratic approach embodied in the Positive Action program.
Contrary to the assertions of so many of his critics, however, such ‘Dewey-esque’
(O’Hear, 1991, p. 27) approaches to education are quite rare. As Kliebard (2002)
notes, ‘it would be a formidable task to find any of Dewey’s important ideas on
curriculum actually being practiced in American schools’ (p. 94). Still, Dewey
serves as an awfully ‘convenient scapegoat’ (Beck, 2008). The problem for his critics
is that, evincing great character, he refuses to take the blame.
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